It’s been over three weeks since the Penguins acquired Erik Karlsson, yet I haven’t written a word about him or how he’ll impact the team until now.
That’s partially because my first reaction to any acquisition or signing is always to put together some comprehensive piece outlining that player’s unique skills, their strengths and weaknesses, plus how they might fit in stylistically.
Well, did anybody in Penguins Land really need one of those on Karlsson? We’re not talking about some mystery middle-six winger here, we’re talking about the dude who just won the Norris Trophy … you know, the first defenseman to post 100-plus points in a single season since the early 1990s.
Karlsson is the greatest offensive defenseman of his generation and everyone is well aware of it, just as everyone’s well aware that he ain’t exactly a shutdown force in his own end. While I definitely would have a blast sitting here and breaking down his in-zone coverage or all the exciting ways he creates offense, it wouldn’t be anything new.
I’m certainly not holding myself to a standard that everything I write must be groundbreaking, but an overall look at Karlsson’s game seemed like low-hanging fruit. And by the time I got this thing up and going, that fruit had been picked over.
One thing that’s been touched on but hasn’t gotten a real in-depth look is the way Karlsson will impact the Penguins’ power play and, more specifically, whether or not he can induce needed change to the way they transition the puck up ice and gain the offensive blue line with the man advantage.
So, let’s do that.
For all the flack the Penguins’ power play took last season, they did perform better than local perception suggested. The rate at which they scored on the power play (8.26 goals per hour) ranked 10th in the NHL and the rate at which they generated quality chances (9.18 expected goals per hour) ranked ninth.
This is why Mike Sullivan continued to back his power play when taking questions from myself and other reporters about the lack of changes throughout most of the season. He admitted their consistency and execution could’ve improved, but because there was a decent foundation in place (decent chance-creation rates), those two items should’ve improved over time, theoretically.
The problem, though, is that the actual process — the meat and bones — behind the Penguins’ good-not-great expected goal generation was rather ugly far more often than not.
A perfect example from an early-season game in Columbus:
The Blue Jackets effectively formed a wall of coverage in their half of the neutral zone as Sidney Crosby came right up the middle. They knew what was coming. Every team always knew what was coming: The drop pass.
As so, they were prepared to squash whatever course of action the Penguins could take from there. Ideally, a well-executed drop pass paves the way for the recipient to gain the zone themself, or to pull coverage toward the middle, opening passing lanes to the wingers stationed along the boards just outside the blue line.
Here, the Blue Jackets were perfectly aligned to clog Evgeni Malkin’s path after receiving the drop pass from Crosby, and they were also in good position to prevent clean passes to either of Rickard Rakell or Bryan Rust on the flanks:
Malkin did well to recognize that his best bet was to double back with possession and try again, but he subsequently threw the puck away:
Not much intensity. No cohesion. Be sure to execute a drop pass. That’s it. That’s all there was to the plan.
Like I said, every team knew what was coming each time the Penguins were transitioning on the power play:
Talk about sitting on the drop pass.
Being predictable for your teammates? Really important. Being predictable for the opposition? Strikes me as a problem:
It was painful watching a trio of future Hall of Famers fight their natural instincts in order to appease the apparent “one drop pass per rush up ice” rule.
Mercifully, the Penguins pretty much abandoned the drop pass toward the end of the season. I give them props for going with a different look. It needed to happen. Rather than plodding their way up ice, they were suddenly looking to push the pace and gain the zone quickly.
The idea was fine, but in practice it lacked much depth and basically left the puck carrier in situations where they had to race right into multiple defending sticks and bodies without a decent second option that didn’t involve dumping the puck, just like this:
And this:
Needless to say, they didn’t stumble into a new recipe for success.
The reality here — and I know I’ve been saying this for several years now — is that the upcoming season might just be the last legitimate shot for this core to make some noise.
Think about it. If not the 2023-24 season, when? By the time the 2025 playoffs roll around, Crosby will be approaching the age of 38, Malkin will be approaching 39 and Letang will be 38. Winning a Stanley Cup with each of your top players in their late 30s is unprecedented.
It’s not betting against them to point out how much of a challenge it’ll truly be to return to glory one more time. If anything, it’s a testament to the longevity of their elite play that we’re even discussing the possibility of another run.
But in my eyes, another run has got to happen right now. And that’s why it’s so important to get the power play figured out. In the event that Crosby and Malkin, especially, start to show their age with considerably diminished full-strength production compared to last season, it sure would be nice to be able to rely on the power play to make up for some of it.
In the event their full-strength production remains roughly the same, it sure would be nice to have the power play push the offense over the top.
Will Karlsson’s presence alone be enough to induce an effective change to the way they transition the puck on the power play? In short: Not quite. But he can still be a piece of the solution.
There’s this notion among Penguins fans that the Sharks’ power play revolved entirely around Karlsson and letting him do anything and everything all over the ice. As far as the offensive zone was concerned, that’s pretty much true. If there wasn’t an immediate shooting opportunity or high-danger passing lane, the Sharks frequently worked the puck back to Karlsson to let him work his magic.
As far as their plan of attack to enter the zone, Karlsson wasn’t a do-it-all machine that routinely skated the puck end-to-end by himself. Actually, I was a bit surprised at how infrequently the Sharks relied on him to be the one to gain the offensive blue line with possession.
Make no mistake, he’s money when it comes to manipulating space and coverage with the puck on his stick. But most instances in which he head-manned a zone entry were off neutral-zone faceoffs or retrievals of clearing attempts that didn’t make it the distance of the ice.
It sure is pretty when he does it:
When the Sharks had to build from the back in a controlled breakout, however, it really was a collective effort to gain the zone. The success of each rush was dependent on coordinated movements and timing, not necessarily the work of any individual.
The Sharks’ power play was not better than the Penguins’ power play last season. I want to make that very clear. Although they, too, frequently utilized the drop pass, I found their crispness and overall efficiency in that regard to be significantly better.
A pretty standard controlled power-play breakout for them would start off something like this:
Here, Karlsson retrieved the puck behind the net and began to make his way toward the penalty-kill’s first forechecker. While he did that, a pair of forwards swung deep into the zone with him in preparation for the inevitable drop pass.
Karlsson, in my opinion, does a better job than Letang at changing angles and using speed differentials against the first forechecker, which creates a more effective drop pass. If the initial carrier doesn’t present themself as a moderate threat, the drop becomes rather pointless.
When the initial carrier does present themself as a moderate threat, it keeps the opposing penalty-kill honest and — more often than not — should open up a number of clean paths into the offensive zone:
Once the drop pass was executed, both players trailing Karlsson were skating up ice in sync with each other. That was vital to making the entry happen. With the Capitals’ penalty-kill sagging into their own end, the Sharks had clean entry paths on both wings.
Technically, this look from the Sharks didn’t differ a whole lot from what the Penguins were trying to do. The difference is in the cohesion and execution:
The Sharks were able to create a nearly identical look later in the same game. This time, though, they utilized the other side of the ice to gain the zone:
Part of me wonders if Karlsson’s contributions toward an effective drop-pass breakout will prevent the Penguins’ coaching staff from breathing some fresh air into their power-play tactics. They’ve been using the drop pass for years. It wouldn’t be a shock if they keep trying to force it with someone who’s familiar with it and capable of pulling it off.
Regardless of whether it’s more of the same or legitimate change going forward, Karlsson won’t single-handedly solve every problem that the power-play breakout faced. He’ll make a massive difference inside the offensive zone with unmatched playmaking and elite finishing ability, but it’s on Sullivan and Todd Reirden to put a game plan in place that sets up the entire unit for success.
Good breakdown of the breakouts, Danny. It will be interesting to see how the difference in primary puck carrier causes defenders to align and react.
Also I naturally don’t watch anywhere near as much film as you do. Is the drop pass on breakouts this ubiquitous across the league? Like should I stop yelling “enough with the *&%# drop pass”
Any opinions on who you want the five man unit to be? Or will that be a future article?
I’d ideally like to see R. Smith, Crosby, Rakell, Karlsson, and Malkin. But feel like we see Guentzel - Crosby - Malkin, Letang,Karlsson.